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HARRY H. WELLINGTON-I"
[T] HIS committee expects to give attention to problems inherent in labor-
management collusion, underworld infiltration of the labor movement, misuse
of union and welfare funds, suppression of civil rights and liberties of union
members by their leaders, conflict of interest, and the use of violence, shake-
downs, and extortions."1 These great expectations were pronounced by Sen-
ator McClellan, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activi-
ties in the Labor or Management Field, at that body's first public meeting. Their
realization is spread upon the now vast record of his committee.2 This record
-perhaps "expose is more appropriate-has prompted legislators to suggest
federal regulation in three broad areas :3 protection of the beneficiary's interest
in employee pension, health and welfare funds ;4 protection of the individual
member's interest in union treasuries; 5 and protection of the employee's
tAssociate Professor, Yale Law School.
1. Hearings Before the Select Committee of the Senate on Improper Actizities in the
Labor or Managcment Field, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 2 (1957).
2. The hearings were begun on February 26, 1957, and were still in full swing in the
summer of 1958. As of April 1, 1958, the record contained 10,384 pages. See Hearings,
supra note 1, at pt. 26. The committee submitted its first interim report in April 1958. See
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON IMPROPER AcTirIEs IN THE LABOR OR MANAGEMENT FIELD,
INTERIM REPORT (March 1958).
3. The Select Committee itself made legislative recommendations in five areas: (1)
pension, health and welfare funds; (2) union funds; (3) union democracy; (4) middle-
man in labor-management disputes; and (5) federal pre-emption in labor relations. Id. at
450-51. The last of these problems is extraneous to the Committee's work. Most of the
proposed legislation seems to fit more easily into the classifications suggested in text. See
notes 4-6, 9 infra.
4. The Senate Select Committee was but one of several congressional committees to
inquire-and this was not central to its purpose-into the pension-welfare fund problem.
See S. REP. No. 1734, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956) ; Hearings Before the Subcommittee
on Welfare and Pension Plans Legislation of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). The issues in this area are examined in Note,
Protection of Beneficiaries Under Employee Benefit Plans, 58 CoLuM. L. REv. 78 (1958).
The Senate has passed the Pension and Welfare Fund Disclosure Bill, S. 2888, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1958). See 104 CONG. REc. 6778 (daily ed. April 28, 1958).
5. See, e.g., S. 3974, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., tit. 1 (1958) (Kennedy-Ives. Senator Ken-
nedy's first labor bill was S. 3454, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958)). S. 3974 was favorably
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interest in the fidelity of union officials who bargain with employers. 6 Except
in the realm of the union-trusteeship---a device for international union control
of the local-congressional investigation has not disclosed the employee's stake
in democratic union government to be a fourth area of needed legislation.7
Past studies of unions, however, do suggest such a need. s Moreover, in-
creased interest in all aspects of internal union affairs following the committee's
much-publicized hearings has stimulated discussion about the advisability of
statutory regulation of union admissions, expulsions, elections and interna-
tional-local relations,9 that is, of those activities clearly vital to successful
union democracy. Indeed, legislation, avowedly to promote such democracy,
has recently been introduced in Congress.' 0 This Article is concerned with
federal regulation of the first three subjects." Before reaching admissions,
reported out of committee, see S. REP. No. 1684, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), and passed
the Senate in amended form, 104 CONG. REC. 10381 (daily ed. June 17, 1958). See also
S. 3097, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., tit. 1, 2 (1958) (Administration bill).
6. See, e.g., S. 3974, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., tit. 1, § 102 (1958); S. 3097, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess. § 103 (1958).
7. Hearings, supra note 1.
8. See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, DEMOCRACY IN TRADE UNIONS (1943);
Aaron & Komaroff, Statutory Regulation of Internal Union Affairs, 44 ILL. L. REv. 425,
631 (1949) ; Kovner, The Legal Protection of Civil Liberties Within Unions, 1948 WIs.
L. REV. 18; Summers, The Right To Join a Union, 47 COLUM. L. Rv. 33 (1947); Sum-
mers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1951) ; Summers,
Disciplinary Powers of Unions, 3 IND. & LAB. REtL. REV. 483 (1950); Summers, Union
Powers and Workers' Rights, 49 MIcH. L. REV. 805 (1951); Summers, Union Democracy
and Union Discipline, N.Y.U. 5TH CONF. ON LAB. 443 (1952); Summers, Admission
Policies of Labor Unions, 61 Q.J. EcoN. 66 (1946) ; Taft, Democracy in Trade Unions,
36 AM. EcoN. REV. 359 (Supp. 1946) ; Taft, The Constitutional Power of the Chief Offieer
in American Labor Unions, 62 Q.J. EcoN. 459 (1948) ; Taft, Judicial Procedure in Labor
Unions, 59 Q.J. EcoN. 370 (1945).
9. Cox, THE ROLE OF LAW IN PRESERVING UNION DEMOCRACY (unpublished paper;
copy on file in Yale Law School Library 1958); SEIDMAN, DEMOCRACY IN THE LABOR
MOVEMENT (N.Y. State School of Ind. & Lab. Rel. Bull. No. 39, 1958) ; Barbash, Union
Democracy, in Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare, Selected Readings on Government Regulation of Inter al Union Affairs Affecting
the Rights of Members, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 132 (1958) (hereinafter cited as SELECTED
READINGS) ; Kerr, Unions and Union Leaders of Their Own Choosing, in SEREcr READ-
INGS 106; Summers, Legislating Union Denwcracy, in id. at 250.
10. The current session of Congress has considered several bills. See, e.g., S. 3974,
85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), discussed note 5 supra (concerning elections and trustee-
ship) ; S. 3097, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958) (elections) ; S. 3069, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1958) (elections, discipline, trusteeships).
11. International-local relations pose discrete questions which will not be discussed.
Nonetheless, trusteeships-the most troublesome aspect of international-local union rela-
tions-may affect the individual as extensively as admission, discipline and election policy.
Federal interest in the latter areas may be greater, however, because admission, discipline
and election policies more directly impinge upon the individual. The multistate character
of trusteeships would nevertheless seem to overweigh this consideration. In any event,
the additional complexities attending the trusteeship problem make its treatment in this
Airticle undesirable.
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expulsions and elections proper, however, the Article will treat some pre-
liminary issues, unrelated to the partisan political considerations involved in
enacting labor legislation, but relevant to ultimate evaluation of the federal
government's proper role in protecting union democracy.12
First, perhaps, "union democracy" should be defined, and then some assump-
tions made. Clyde Summers' definition is especially apt. "Union democracy,"
he says, "means, first, full freedom of dissent, of criticism, and of opposition.
Union democracy requires, second, that decisions shall be made and executed
on the basis of the members' expressed desires-the right to choose, even
unwisely. Self-government is self-fulfillment. Third, recognition of personal
worth requires recognition of the equality of men-the right to fair and equal
treatment. Minorities must not be trampled upon by assertive majorities.
Finally, every person is entitled to be judged only after full and fair hearings
before tribunals that have no personal or institutional stake other than the
search for justice."'13 This is more than a definition. In a declarative fashion,
Summers' words establish a prima facie case for democratic union government.
They also suggest why protection of the employee's interest in admission, disci-
pline and election is so important to achievement of union democracy. Full
admission of all employees represented by a union is crucial because it is the
condition precedent to full participation by the group most directly interested
in union decisions. Protection from arbitrary invocation of discipline permits
opposition. And the ballot in a free election is the individual union member's
weapon for inducing performance in accordance with his desire.
But open admission, fair discipline and free elections do not make union
democracy. 14 Apathy-to mention only the most destructive factor--can nullify
12. The "political" considerations which therefore will be examined concern "the con-
duct of government, referring in the widest application to the judicial, executive, and
legislative branches .... " 3 WEBSTER, NEWv INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1909 (2d una-
bridged ed. 1957).
13. Summers, Democracy in Trade Unions, The New Leader, Feb. 10, 1958, p. 7.
14. Probably the most instructive book on union democracy and the conditions neces-
sary for its existence is LPsET, Taow & COLEMAN, UNION DEFOCRAcY (1956). See,
particularly, id. at 393-418.
Clyde Summers has suggested that the following additional requirements are necessary
for "functioning democracy" at the international level: "First, democracy requires avail-
able channels of communication to make possible interchange of ideas, distribution of in-
formation, and organization of protest. Second, democracy must provide opportunities for
the training of leaders who gain the skills and status to provide effective leadership to the
opposition. Third, democracy is severely handicapped if there is a monolithic bureaucracy
of officers and staff employees who hold their positions subject to the will of those in
power. Protest from those best informed and able to lead is silenced, and any opposition
is overwhelmed by the disciplined machine. Fourth, the three elements above suggest the
critical value of local autonomy. The local newspaper may provide a counterbalance to
the national publication; the local may have funds and facilities to make protests known
throughout the union; it can provide independent leaders and an independent bureaucracy.
This same value may be served by district, regional or departmental structures to the
extent that they are independent of central control." Summers, The Usefudness of Law
in Achieving Union Democracy, 48 Ams. EcoN. Rav. 44, 46 (Supp. 1958).
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these requisites. 15 Admission, discipline and election, however, are not only areas
of primary importance to union democracy, they are areas susceptible to effec-
tive legislation. 16
Democracy in unions is worth having, as the Summers definition indicates.
Most people, including most union people, agree,17 although some observers
seem to question its importance.'3s Their skepticism is grounded in a suspicion
that undemocratic unions are likely to be more responsible to the community
than democratic ones, or that nonresponsible union officers are as likely to
know labor's best interests as directly responsible ones. 19 Both of these theories
are usually-and quite properly-advanced tentatively. As reflections of em-
pirical data, they lack evidentiary support; as naked assertions, persuasive-
ness.20 This Article will assume, therefore, that democratic labor unions are
desirable-the author has been conditioned so to believe without requiring an
overwhelming demonstration of democracy's superiority.
Such a belief in democratic union government and the realization that
unions are not always democratic may be enough, for some, to justify federal
legislation. Particularly so, if the belief and the realization are coupled with
an assurance that labor unions are different from private social clubs. Today,
this assurance may be ventured without the presentation of evidence, for labor
unions notoriously exercise enormous economic power. It is also obvious that
this power far exceeds that of any other "club," save, perhaps, the United
States Senate. Connection between end and means is thus easily made: unions
should be democratic. The federal government should be concerned with
15. "[D]emocracy is achieved if the members can make their will felt, if they can
replace the leaders and change the policies that they dislike. Their ability to do this,
however, is diminished by the low level of membership participation found in most local
unions." Seidman, Requirements for Union Democracy, 81 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 255
(1958). See Code VI, Union Democratic Processes, in AFL-CIO CODES OF ETHICAL
PRACTICES 41, 42 (1957). For a study of apathy and its effect in a British labor union,
see GOLDSTEIN, THE GOVERNMENT OF A BRITISH TRADE UNION (1952).
16. "The law could not, if it would, decree union democracy, for apathetic members
cannot be compelled to action, nor can indifference be transformed to interest. The most
that the law can do is to safeguard the basic rights essential for the life of union democracy
and to contribute where possible to encouraging those institutions which give it vitality."
Summers, The Usefulness of Law in Achieving Union Democracy, 48 Am. EcoN. REV.
44, 52 (Supp. 1958).
17. "The entire labor movement in the United States and in all free countries in the
world is based upon the democratic tradition. Freedom and democracy are the essential
attributes of our labor movement. Labor organizations lacking these attributes, like Hit-
ler's Labor Front, Franco's syndicates and Moscow's captive unions, are unions in name
only." Goldberg, The Rights and Responsibilities of Union Members, 9 LAB. L.J. 298,
299 (1958). See AFL-CIO CONSTiTUTION art. II, § 10; see also Code VI, Union Demo-
cratic Processes, in AFL-CIO CODES OF ETHICAL PRACTICES 41 (1957).
18. See ALLEN, POWER IN TRADE UNIONS 10-15 (1954) ; Dunlop, The Public Interest
in Internal Affairs of Unions, 1957 A.B.A. SECTION OF LAB. REL. LAW 10; Jacobs, Union
Democracy and the Public Good, Commentary, Jan. 1958, p. 68.
19. See authorities cited note 18 supra.
20. See, generally, LiISET, TROW & COLEMAN, UNION DEMOCRACY 403-412 (1956).
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private groups which possess very great power. This second proposition is
also beyond debate. Since some unions are not democratic, but all unions are
powerful, the federal government, so the syllogism goes, must see that all
unions become democratic.
But this easily assumed conclusion that "there 'oughtta' be a law" stamped
"made in Washington," should properly be tested by an analysis of the
complex body of federal and state regulation already touching on labor unions.
Some of this regulation must be understood in principle, if not in detail, before
a decision to alter the status quo is made. Such an understanding is essential
to an appreciation of the present distribution of power and responsibility among
federal government, state governments and private groups. And this distri-
bution must be of central concern whenever federal legislation in a new area of
activity is proposed.
21
FEDERAL LABOR LAW AND THE DUTY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Collective bargaining is the central process of industrial relations in this
country, a method of private ordering on a grand scale. Its product, the col-
lective agreement, is a code, not a contract. Because this private arrangement
so widely affects the public, one of the principal purposes of federal labor
regulation is to shield the bargaining process from private or state interference. 22
The Railway Labor Act and the National Labor Relations Act, by sanction-
ing the combination of employees, ensure the roughly equivalent labor-manage-
ment power distribution which a national program of collective bargaining pre-
21. Before federal power is invoked, some limitations on legislating for an enlightened
union society should also be understood. A specific statutory provision designed to force
democracy upon union members would surely fail to accomplish its purpose. Rather, legis-
lators would be wise to support a statute designed to encourage democracy in unions. To
use a crude example, instead of favoring legislation which would compel members to at-
tend union meetings, the legislator would be well advised to advocate statutory protection
for the union member who participated in an unpopular cause. Cf. note 16 supra.
With the exception of the tangential regulation described in the section of this Article
entitled FEDERAL LABOR LAW AND THE DuTy OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNIENT, at the time
of writing, no federal legislation had been enacted dealing with union democracy. S. 3974,
85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), discussed notes 5, 10 supra, which passed the Senate on June
17, 1958, was before the House where it was expected to die. See N.Y. Times, June 19,
1958, p. 1, col. 5. Although the bill was passed 88 to 1 by the Senate, see 104 CONG. REc.
10381 (daily ed. June 17, 1958), no discussion of the problems examined in this Article
seems to have been raised before that body.
22. National Labor Relations Act § 8, 61 STAT. 140 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158 (1952), proscribes, inter alia, certain employer and union practices which are inimical
to collective bargaining. Section 2 of the Railway Labor Act, 44 STAT. 577 (1926), as
amended, 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1952), is the pertinent provision of that statute. These acts do
not expressly prohibit state interference with national policy, but case law makes very
clear what is implicit in the statute. See, e.g., Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S.
1 (1957) ; Garner v. Local 776, Teamsters Union, AFL, 346 U.S. 485 (1953) ; Hill v.
Florida cx rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538 (1945). See also Cox, Federalism in the Law of
Labor Relations, 67 HAgv. L. REv. 1297 (1954).
1958]
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supposes.23 The second prerequisite of effective bargaining is also accomplished
by statute-investing the union of a majority of the employees in an appropriate
unit with the right to represent all employees in that unit, and requiring the
employer to bargain in good faith with this union about wages, hours and
conditions of employment.2 In J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 25 the Supreme Court
gave direction to this obligation in a decision with far-reaching implications
for the problems discussed in this Article. The J. I. Case Company had entered
into individual contracts of employment with seventy-five per cent of its labor
force prior to National Labor Relations Board certification of a CIO union
as employee bargaining representative. The individual contracts were of a
year's duration, provided for pay at a specified rate and for other company
benefits, and imposed duties of faithfulness, honesty and responsibility for im-
proper work on each contracting employee. After NLRB certification, the
union "asked the Company to bargain. It refused [as to matters covered by
the employee agreements], declaring that it could not deal with the union in
any manner affecting rights and obligations under the individual contracts
.. .. "26 The Board held this refusal an unfair labor practice, and the Supreme
Court agreed.
"Individual contracts, no matter what the circumstances that justify
their execution or what their terms, may not be availed of to defeat or
delay the procedures prescribed by the National Labor Relations Act
looking to collective bargaining, nor to exclude the contracting employee
from a duly ascertained bargaining unit; nor may they be used to forestall
bargaining or to limit or condition the terms of the collective agreement....
Wherever private contracts conflict with its functions, they obviously
must yield or the Act would be reduced to a futility.
'2 7
This decision is sound. It is solidly grounded in the language of the National
Labor Relations Act 2s and in that statute's legislative history.2 9 Perhaps only
23. National Labor Relations Act § 7, 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1952) ;
Railway Labor Act § 2 (Fourth), 44 STAT. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 152
(Fourth) (1952).
24. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(5), 61 STAT. 141 (1947), as amended, 29
U.S.C § 158(a) (5) (1952) ; Railway Labor Act § 2, 44 STAT. 577 (1926), as amended, 45
U.S.C. § 152 (1952). See 61 STAT. 143 (1947), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1952):
"Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the ma-
jority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive
representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargain-
ing...." See also 61 STAT. 141, 142 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b) (3) (requiring
good faith bargaining by the union), 158(d) (defining good faith bargaining) (1952).
25. 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
26. Id. at 334.
27. Id. at 337.
28. 61 STAT. 143 (1947), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1952), quoted note 24
mepra. Cf. Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S.
342 (1944) (applying the majority-rule principle of Case to industries regulated by the
Railway Labor Act).
29. The relevant legislative history is reviewed with care and accuracy in Weyand,
Majority Ride in Collective Bargaining, 45 CoLum. L. Rav. 556 (1945).
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Mr. justice Roberts, who alone dissented, seriously questioned the Court's
opinion.30 The decision is nevertheless far-reaching.
Several factors which might be thought relevant to the judgment in
the case are quite irrelevant. It makes no difference, for example, whether
an individual is able to do better bargaining on his own than under
the collective agreement 3 or whether his own contract is negotiated before
or after the union is certified.32 Most important, it is immaterial whether the
separate contract is with an employee who does not want to be represented by
the majority union.33 This means that in the collective bargaining process-
or at least during negotiation of the collective agreement-an employee, even
against his wishes, is represented by the majority union. After voting against
the union, a dissenting employee who remains in dissent or is denied member-
ship in the majority union, has no say about his wages, hours and working
conditions. The law of his job is determined by his employer and another man's
union.
Collective bargaining might work in this country without the Case principle
of majority rule. It does elsewhere.34 But the principle has much to be said
for it, as Mr. Justice Jackson observed in his celebrated Case opinion:
"i[T]he individual contract cannot be effective as a waiver of any benefit
to which the employee otherwise would be entitled under the trade agree-
ment. The very purpose of providing by statute for the collective agree-
ment is to supersede the terms of separate agreements of employees with
terms which reflect the strength and bargaining power and serve the wel-
fare of the group ....
".... [A] dvantages to individuals may prove as disruptive of industrial
peace as disadvantages. They are a fruitful way of interfering with organ-
ization and choice of representatives; increased compensation if individu-
ally deserved, is often earned at the cost of breaking down some other
standard thought to be for the welfare of the group, and always creates
the suspicion of being paid at the long-range expense of the group as a
whole." 35
The majority-rule concept is today unquestionably at the center of our federal
labor policy.
Prior to the federal statutes, a dissenting employee could represent himself
unless the majority union, without the benefit of federal protection against
30. 321. U.S. at 342 (dissent registered without opinion).
31. Id. at 338-39.
32. Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342
(1944).
33. In addition to Case, see Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944);
Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., supra note 32; Medo
Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944).
34. See, e.g., Teller, British Versus American Labor Laws and Practices: A Study
in Contrasts, 1957 A.B.A. SECrION OF LAB. REr_ LAW 19; Kahn-Freund, English Labor
Law and Collective Bargaining, 1957 id. at 42, 44. See, generally, CONTEmPORARY COL-
LECTIvE BARGAINING IN SEVEN COUNTRIES (Sturmthal ed. 1957).
35. 321, U.S. at 338-39.
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employer and state interference, had sufficient economic power to extract a
union-shop agreement from his employer. This right of self-representation
may not in itself have been very valuable-one worker had little leverage. If
in a given situation, however, there was more than one dissenting worker,
combination and independent representation were legally open to this minority
group. But whether the right of self-representation was worth much or not,
its replacement by the majority-rule principle of federal law and that same
law's protection of the union from employer and state interference combine
to impose a substantial obligation upon the federal government.
Unlike an employer, who usually has no reason to discriminate against a
minority employee, the majority union may have several reasons.a6 Two are
apparent: the dissenter is a threat to the power position of the union;37 the
dissenter is a participant in labor's share of the gross returns. Less for the
nonunion man may mean more for union men.SS Whether this is actually the
case in every situation is irrelevant, for an apparent conflict of interest always
exists. It would be intolerable under these circumstances if the union of the
majority, empowered and protected by federal law, were free to disregard the
interests of the minority. Indeed, Supreme Court opinions suggest that a
statute investing a labor organization with the right to represent all employees
would be unconstitutional if it did not impose a duty upon the chosen organi-
zation to represent all employees fairly.39
This constitutional question has not been decided because the federal statutes
have been read to require fair representation. Although the obligation is not
explicit in either the Railway Labor Act or the National Labor Relations Act,
in a series of wise and not unorthodox opinions beginning with Steele v. Louis-
ville & N.R.R.,40 the Supreme Court has interpreted both statutes to avoid
the potential constitutional difficulty.41 In Steele, petitioner-a Negro fireman
whom union rules barred from membership-was employed by the railroad.
The Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, the exclusive bar-
gaining representative of the carrier's white and Negro firemen, had a collec-
tive agreement with the railroad which discriminated against Steele and the
other Negroes in the unit, because they were Negroes, in matters of seniority
and promotion. Steele, both in his own behalf and in a representative capacity,
36. In some cases, of course, the employer's desire for peaceful relations with the
union could lead to employer discrimination against the minority (anti-union) employee.
37. Cf. Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944).
38. To those who may deny that this is true in the long run, Lord Keynes's quip that,
in the long run we will all be dead is, I think, an adequate answer.
39. Compare Railway Employees' Dep't, AFL v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 232 (1956),
with Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 198-99 (1944) ; id. at 208 (concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Murphy).
40. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
41. The duty of fair representation has been found in the Railway Labor Act § 2
(Fourth), 44 STAT. 578 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 152 (Fourth) (1952), and in
the National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 49 STAT. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(a) (1952).
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sued the parties to the agreement in an Alabama court. Alleging a federal
right to fair representation which had not been respected, he sought to enjoin
operation of the discriminatory agreement. The Alabama Supreme Court
sustained a demurrer to his complaint, and held that because the Brotherhood
had plenary power as exclusive representative under the Railway Labor Act,
Steele had no federal right to fair representation. 42 A unanimous Supreme
Court reversed this judgment. Chief Justice Stone's majority opinion rests
on the following paragraph:
"Unless the labor union representing a craft owes some duty to repre-
sent non-union members of the craft, at least to the extent of not dis-
criminating against them as such in the contracts which it makes as their
representative, the minority would be left with no means of protecting
their interests, or, indeed, their right to earn a livelihood by pursuing
the occupation in which they are employed. While the majority of the
craft chooses the bargaining representative, when chosen it represents,
as the Act by its terms makes plain, the craft or class, and not the majori-
ty. The fair interpretation of the statutory language is that the organi-
zation chosen to represent a craft is to represent all its members, the
majority as well as the minority, and it is to act for and not against those
whom it represents. It is a principle of general application that the exer-
cise of a granted power to act in behalf of others involves the assumption
toward them of a duty to exercise the power in their interest and behalf,
and that such a grant of power will not be deemed to dispense with all
duty toward those for whom it is exercised unless so expressed.
43
Subsequent cases, all apparently proceeding from the Steele rationale, make
it clear that the majority union's duty of fair representation extends to unions
regulated by the National Labor Relations Act as well as to those governed by
the Railway Labor Act,44 to union members as well as nonmembers in the
bargaining unit 45 and to employees in a separate unit who are economically
dependent upon the bargain struck in the larger, closely related unit.46 The
cases also make plain-and this of couse is implicit in Steele-that discrimina-
tion not based upon color may violate the union's duty even as discrimination
along color lines does.47 This statement should not obscure the difference be-
tween the cases involving color and those involving other types of discrimina-
42. 245 Ala. 113, 16 So. 2d 416 (1944). The Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 STAT. 70
(1932), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1952), notwithstanding, the suit could have
been initiated in a federal district court, see Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Fire-
men, 323 U.S. 210 (1944).
43. 323 U.S. at 201-02.
44. Syres v. Local 23, Oil Workers Int'l Union, 350 U.S. 892, reversing per curiam,
223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955); Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 255-56 (1944).
45. Syres v. Local 23, Oil Workers Int'l Union, supra note 44.
46. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952). See Cox,
The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VmL. L. REv. 151, 157-59 (1957) ; The Supreme Court,
1951 Term, 66 HARv. L. REv. 89, 148-49 (1952).
47. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337-39 (1953) ; Trailmobile
Co. v. Whirls, 331 U.S. 40, 62, 69 (1947) (dissenting opinions of Justices Frankfurter and
Jackson).
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tion. Distinctions in a collective agreement which turn upon skin pigmentation
are readily branded "unfair." It may well be, however, that particular econom-
ic distinctions in a collective agreement are entirely equitable. Indeed, some
distinctions are essential.48 No one would suggest that wage differentials be-
tween skilled and unskilled workers necessarily violate the union's duty of
fair representation. In this situation, perhaps, a failure to discriminate would
be a breach of duty. On the other hand, a situation can be easily imagined in
which an economic distinction has no legitimate basis in industrial experience,
and can be explained only as a disregard of the interests of a minority group
by the majority union. An obvious case is the union which, subsequent to an
organizational campaign, negotiates a collective agreement providing inferior
seniority rights for employees who, as the evidence demonstrates, happened
openly to oppose unionization.
49
Even more difficult than separation of unfair from fair in the negotiation of
an agreement is making the same distinction in the administration of a collec-
tive contract. Quite apart from majority-minority interests which may exist
when an agreement is being formed, the union in processing grievances may
have an interest in the compromise or settlement of a complaint without regard
to its particular merits or the complainant's majority or minority status. "Give
a little here to get a little there" is not unknown to this process, and such flexi-
bility may well be to the general benefit.50 Yet the employee's interest under a
collective agreement sometimes is worthy of more protection than his interest
in fair treatment during the negotiations.51 It surely is if alleged back pay is
involved. Thus, these problems have at least some parallel in familiar legal
concepts. Expectations, for example those provided by the existing collective
agreement, acted upon with reasonable reliance, would usually be protected.
Expectations, alone or with unreasonable reliance-such as the belief that
seniority status will not be disturbed by negotiation of a new agreement-often
would not be.5 2 The National Labor Relations Act, in a way, recognizes this
distinction. It allows an employee, at least in the absence of a contrary provision
in a collective bargaining agreement, individually to process his grievance, even
48. See Cox, LABOR LAW 963 (4th ed. 1958); CHAMBERLAIN, COLLECTIVE BARGAIN-
ING 239-57 (1951).
49. Cf. Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944).
50. See, generally, Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARv. L. Ray. 601
(1956) ; see also WuuTz, DUE PROCESS OF ARBITRATION (unpublished paper; copy on file in
Yale Law School Library 1958) ; cf. NEw YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY FACT FINDING
COMMITTEE, REPORT TO THE Naw YORK CITY TRAN rT AUTHORITY 15 (Nov. 30, 1957) : "[I]t
is now commonly accepted as a sign of maturity and responsibility for labor organizations
to screen grievances scrupulously and to rule out those which can serve only to ... satisfy
individual desires rather than to give meaning to the labor agreement."
51. See Note, Duty of the Union to Minority Groups in the Bargaining Unit, 65 HARV.
L. R v. 490, 495-500 (1952).
52. See Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945), qualified o rehearing,
327 U.S. 661 (1946). On the general importance in law of this distinction, see Fuller &
Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YAI E L.J. 52 (1936).
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though, under Case, he may not negotiate his conditions of employment.-3
This statutory provision may afford some protection to the individual. It also
may be harmful to the long range interests of the many represented by the
union.m5
While the Case doctrine does not apply, at least in its full vigor, to the settle-
ment of grievances, the Steele doctrine does pertain fully to this aspect of collec-
tive bargaining.r6 Since the individual may present his own grievance, the un-
answerable logic of Steele is missing; the wisdom of the extension, on the other
hand, can hardly be questioned. First, it must be remembered that, quite apart
from the majority-rule principle, the union's economic position in the plant has
been protected by federal law. 7 Second, and not unrelated, while the individual
may have a right under the statute to present his grievance to his employer, he
has very little leverage and probably very little skill. He badly needs fair repre-
sentation. s
In addition to the Steele principle of fair representation, the National Labor
Relations Act offers some protection to the minority employee in two ways.
Certain job discrimination against nonunion members is an unfair labor prac-
53. "[A]ny individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any
time to present grievances to their employer and to have such grievances adjusted, with-
out the intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not in-
consistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect:
Provided further, That the bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be
present at such adjustment." 61 STAT. 143 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1952).
No one has a very clear idea of what this section means. Compare Cox, Rights Under a
Labor Agreement, 69 HAgv. L. Rav. 601, 621-24 (1956), with Report of Committee on
Improvement of Administration of Union-Management Agreements, 1954, Individual Griev-
ances, 50 Nw. U.L. REv. 143 (1955). See Douds v. Local 1250, Retail Wholesale Dep't
Store Union, CIO, 173 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. i949) ; Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB, 147 F.2d
69 (5th Cir. 1945), modifying and enforcing 56 N.L.R.B. 981 (1944); Dazey Corp., 106
N.L.R.B. 553 (1953). See also Dunau, Employee Participation in the Grievance Aspect
of Collective Bargaining, 50 CoLum. L. Rav. 731 (1950). Professor Cox is of the view
that under the proviso "an employer may lawfully promise the union not to process in-
dividual grievances and may also give the union the only legal right to compromise or
enforce substantive obligations." Cox, supra at 624. But see Report of Committee on
Improvement of Administration of Union-Management Agreements, 1954, supra at 177-79.
54. See authorities cited note 53 supra.
55. Ibid.
56. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
57. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
58. "The respondents point to the fact that under the Railway Labor Act aggrieved
employees can file their own grievances with the Adjustment Board or sue the employer
for breach of contract. Granting this, it still furnishes no sanction for the Union's alleged
discrimination in refusing to represent petitioners. The Railway Labor Act, in an attempt
to aid collective action by employees, conferred great power and protection on the bar-
gaining agent chosen by a majority of them. As individuals or small groups the employees
cannot begin to possess the bargaining power of their representative in negotiating with
the employer or in presenting their grievances to him. Nor may a minority choose an-
other agent to bargain in their behalf." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).
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tice r9 and, under specified conditions, an election to decertify the majority
representative is possible.60 The latter remedy is desirable but not especially
effective in protecting the minority, since to win an election the minority must
become a majority. As for the former remedy, it is unfortunate in its present
form. Although offering a degree of protection against loss of employment
through arbitrary exclusion or expulsion from a union shop, the unfair labor
practice, as defined, places undue restrictions upon the union in the administra-
tion of its union security provision. In a union shop, all an employee need do to
protect his job is "tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly
required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership . . . -"I If an
employee is expelled from a union for a valid reason unrelated to payment of
initiation fees or dues-strike-breaking, for instance-the union cannot cause
his discharge under its contract. The job and union membership are separated.
This provision of the act therefore operates more as a limitation upon union
security devices than as a general protection of minority rights.62 By and large,
the NLRB is not engaged in safeguarding such rights.63 Under the Railway
Labor Act also, Steele affords the only general protection.
64
What, in summary, is the present situation with respect to federal regulation
and the individual employee? The national government, by protecting labor
unions in their capacity as bargaining representatives from employer and state
interference and by requiring good faith negotiation, sponsors collective bar-
gaining as a way of organizing labor-management relations. Collective bargain-
ing as an institution in this country has come to include the Case principle of
59. 61 STAT. 140, 141 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) (3), 158(b) (5) (1952).
60. 61 STAT. 144 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1) (A) (ii) (1952).
61. 61 STAT. 141 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1952).
62. The cases are collected and discussed in Daykin, Union Fees and Dues, 9 LAB.
L.J. 289 (1958). See also Aaron & Komaroff, Statutory Regulation of Internal Union
Affairs-I, 44 ILL. L. REv. 425, 446-51 (1949).
63. In proceedings to determine the appropriate bargaining unit, and to certify a union
as collective bargaining agent, the NLRB has sometimes paid lip service to the principles
of Steele. See Larus & Bros. Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 1075, 1081 (1945). But it has done no more
than this. Compare Bethlehem-Alameda Shipyard, Inc., 53 N.L.R.B. 999 (1943), with
Veneer Products, Inc., 81 N.L.R.B. 492 (1949). See Aaron & Komaroff, supra note 62,
at 438-46; Note, 65 HARv. L. Rav. 490, 492-93 (1952).
It has been suggested that the Board has jurisdiction to apply the Steele doctrine in
complaint cases. National Labor Relations Act § 8(b) (3), 61 STAT. 140 (1947), as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (3) (1952), imposes a duty on the union to bargain in good faith. But
is failure to represent all employees fairly a violation of this section? The question has
not been passed upon directly by Board or courts. See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345
U.S. 330, 332 n.4 (1953). An affirmative answer is persuasively articulated in Cox, The
Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VILL. L. REv. 151, 172-75 (1957). See also Note, 65 HAav.
L. REv. 490, 494 n.46 (1952).
64. The union shop provision of the Railway Labor Act, 64 STAT. 1238 (1951), 45
U.S.C. § 152 (Eleventh) (1952), is similar to the union security provisions of the National
Labor Relations Act cited note 59 supra. The administrative bodies established by the
Railway Labor Act afford no protection to the minority railroad employee. See Aaron &
Komaroff, supra note 62, at 428-38.
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majority rule. Consequently, federal sponsorship of collective bargaining im-
poses an obligation on the federal government to protect the minority employee
from abuse by the majority union. But the agencies established under the
Railway Labor Act and the National Labor Relations Act do not effectively
secure minority rights. And although the federal government under Steele
has attempted to discharge its obligation by imposing a duty of fair representa-
tion upon the majority union, and by granting to employees a remedy in the
courts for breach of this duty, complexities of industrial life make it difficult
to tell a fair distinction in the negotiation or administration of a collective agree-
ment from an unfair one. Given this background, is it not doubtful whether
present federal law, which is mainly the Steele doctrine, satisfactorily discharges
the government's obligation to the individual employee? Instinct suggests
that the answer is yes; evidence substantiates the surmise.
STEELE DOCTRINE DIFFICULTIES
Not only is it an expensive and upsetting experience for an employee to go
to court but, once there, he finds it extremely difficult to prove that nonracial
distinctions made in the negotiation or administration of a collective agreement
constitute illegal discrimination. Courts simply do not have the standards by
which to adjudge such distinctions fair or unfair. 5 The Steele case did produce
one standard which has found great favor. "We think that the ... Act imposes
upon the statutory representative of a craft at least as exacting a duty to protect
equally the interests of the members of the craft as the Constitution imposes
upon a legislature to give equal protection to the interests of those for whom
it legislates." '6 Analogy to the equal protection clause works well enough where
distinctions are drawn upon the basis of race, color or creed. But it is difficult
to judge irrational, unreasonable or arbitrary economic distinctions which arise
in collective bargaining. Suppose that company B is acquired by company A,
that the B employees go to work at A where they are outnumbered ten to one,
and that the union in A, which is clearly the representative of a majority of
employees, is certified by the NLRB as exclusive representative. If it and the
company negotiate a collective agreement treating all of the former B people
as new employees for seniority purposes, has the union violated its obligation of
fair representation to the old workers of B ? This is more than a law profes-
sor's examination question. With slight variations, the situation appears again
and again in our industrial jurisprudence. 7 Here, the classification established
65. On the question of standards where discrimination is nonracial, see Cox, The Duty
of Fair Representation, 2 ViLL. L. REv. 151, 166-69 (1957) ; Notes, 62 YAI.E L.J. 282
(1953), 65 HARv. L. Ray. 490 (1952). See also section entitled FAIR RzPRESENTATION
infra.
66. 323 U.S. at 202.
67. See Kahn, Seniority Problems in Business Mergers, 8 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 361
(1955). Probably the most notorious and certainly the most instructive situation is told
in the series of cases known as the Trailmobile litigation. See Trailer Co., 51 N.L.R.B.
1106 (1943); Trailer Co., 53 N.L.R.B. 1248 (1943); Hess v. Trailer Co., 31 Ohio Op.
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by the labor contract can hardly be held arbitrary. Since the seniority of some
employees had to be reduced, the union simply chose an arrangement which
was the least damaging to the seniority status of the greatest number of em-
ployees in the unit. The equal protection clause certainly demands no more of
the states.08 The wisdom of an analogy to the equal protection clause when
determining the legality of economic distinctions in collective bargaining agree-
ments is, however, extremely questionable.
The metaphor which likens a labor agreement to a piece of legislation can be
as misleading as an attempt to equate such a document to a commercial con-
tract. It is useful when employed to disabuse the uninitiated lawyer of naive
beliefs, but should not be taken seriously as describing the union's duty of fair
representation in the collective bargaining process. The analogy preposterously
misrepresents the status of labor unions in our society by suggesting that their
collective bargaining decisions should be accorded the same respect under
federal law as the decisions of state legislatures. The states are not institutions
which have been delegated power by the federal government. Indeed, is it not
the other way around? The labor union, by contrast, is the beneficiary of just
such delegated federal power.69 A responsible government must be intensely
concerned with the way in which a private organization exercises this type of
power. The equal protection clause is inappropriate for this purpose because
it regulates an altogether different kind of relationship.
Since unions are the beneficiaries of delegated federal power, could not work-
able standards be found by analogies to the field of administrative law? This
566 (C.P. 1944); Whirls v. Trailmobile Co., 64 F. Supp. 713 (S.D. Ohio 1945), aff'd,
154 F.2d 866 (6th Cir. 1946), rev'd, 331 U.S. 40 (1947) ; Britt v. Trailmobile Co., 179 F.2d
569 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 820 (1950). See also Notes, 65 HAxv. L. REV. 490,
498-500 (1952), 36 Ohio Op. 390 (1948).
68. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 463-64 (1957):
"[W]e start with the established proposition that the 'prohibition of the Equal
Protection Clause goes no further than the invidious discrimination ... ' The rules
for testing a discrimination have been summarized as follows:
'1 The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take
from the State the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of
the exercise of a wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done
only when it is without any reasonable basis and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2.
A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against that clause
merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it
results in some inequality. 3. When the classification in such a law is called in
question, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it,
the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be as-
sumed. 4. One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden
of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbi-
trary....'
To these rules we add the caution that 'Discriminations of an unusual character
especially suggest careful consideration to determine whether they are obnoxious to
the constitutional provision."
69. See text at note 22 supra.
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undertaking would probably prove fruitless. A federal administrative agency is
composed of individuals nominated for office by the President and confirmed by
the Senate.70 It makes economic decisions in accordance with relatively strict
procedural safeguards 71 and is, in conception at least, wholly disinterested.
The method of selecting labor union officers, the procedures which govern the
decision-making process within the union and the relation of the union as an
organization to the economic decisions it resolves, reveal an institution having
as little similarity to a federal administrative agency as it has to a state
legislature.
72
What standards courts have in fact employed to test the fairness of economic
distinctions in the negotiation and administration of the labor agreement is
unclear. The inappropriate words of constitutional law are found in the
opinions.73 And some decisions indicate no awareness whatever of the prob-
lem. 74 The Supreme Court, in 1953, provided additional guidance by declaring
that "a wide range of reasonableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining
representative in serving the unit it represents, subject always to complete good
faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its discretion." 75
What is clear is that courts have not found it easy to devise standards which
are institutionally sound in this esoteric world of collective bargaining. More
often than not, this difficulty has been recognized and has tended to restrain
judicial intervention. A heavy presumption of regularity, not unlike the pre-
sumption of constitutionality which quite properly attaches to judicial review
of state economic action, is employed in court hearings on union action.7 6 This
70. See, e.g., 61 STAT. 139 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1952).
71. See, e.g., 61 STAT. 143, 144 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 159, 160 (1952).
72. See BAKKE & KXIRR, UNIONS, MANAGEMENT AND THE PUBLIC 180 (1948); GOD-
sTEIN, THE GOVERNmENT OF A BRITISH TRADE UNION (1952); LnisE, TRow & COLE-
MAN, UNION DEMOCRACY (1956).
73. See, e.g., Colbert v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 206 F.2d 9, 13 (9th Cir.
1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 931 (1954); Britt v. Trailmobile Co., 179 F.2d 569, 573 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 820 (1950); Napier v. System Federation No. 91, Railway
Employes' Dep't, AFL, 127 F. Supp. 874, 886 (W.D. Ky. 1955); Hargrove v. Brother-
hood of Locomotive Engineers, 116 F. Supp. 3, 8 (D.D.C. 1953).
Sometimes, federal labor policy embodied in federal statutes will supply the appropriate
standard. See Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944); Note, 65 HARv. L. Rzv.
490, 493 (1952). Or other federal policy may serve as a guide. See Ford Motor Co. v.
Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953) (Selective Service Act of Sept. 16, 1940, c. 720, § 8, 54
STAT. 890).
74. See, e.g., Lewellyn v. Fleming, 154 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1946) ; Jennings v. Jen-
nings, 91, N.E.2d 899 (Ohio Ct. App. 1949). Indeed, some courts have erroneously sug-
gested that the Steele principle applies only to racial discrimination. See, e.g., Spires v.
Southern Ry., 204 F.2d 453, 456-57 (4th Cir. 1953).
75. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953). See Mount v. Grand Int'l
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 226 F.2d 604 (6th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
967 (1956) ("hostile discrimination" as test).
76. See cases cited note 73 supra. See also Cortez v. Ford Motor Co., 349 Mich. 108,
121, 84 N.W.2d 523, 529 (1957); Walker v. Pennsylvania-Reading Seashore Lines, 142
N.J. Eq. 588, 604, 61 A.2d 453, 463-64 (Ch. 1948) ; Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v.
Luckie, 286 S.W.2d 712, 715-16 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955)..
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imposes a strenuous burden of proof upon a plaintiff. 7 Recourse to the pre-
sumption represents an approach which on its face does not discharge the feder-
al government of its responsibility to the individual, a responsibility which
stems from federal protection of labor unions, and from the majority-rule con-
cept of collective bargaining.
In seeking a method for discharging this responsibility, commentators have
suggested-and it is a powerful suggestion-that if the individual employee
belongs to the union, has freedom within the organization to communicate his
economic needs to his officers and holds political power to influence their action,
or indeed, to become an officer himself, the potential for unfair distinctions in
collective bargaining will be reduced.78 Unfortunately, so happy a state does
not exist in all unions 79 and probably cannot be created by law alone.80 Even
if it could, economic abuse of a minority group by a majority through a demo-
cratic process would not be precluded."' But the image of an employee with
such rights suggests a partial solution to the problem of federal responsibility.
Specifically, legislation could require the majority union to admit to membership
each employee in the bargaining unit; protect the member in his political activi-
ty within the labor organization by limiting the union's power to discipline him
for such activity; and guarantee the member free and relatively frequent union
elections.8 2 Is it not appropriate, then, for the federal government, in the dis-
charge of its obligation to the individual employee, to legislate along these lines,
77. See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953) ; Britt v. Trailmobile Co.,
179 F.2d 569 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 820 (1950) ; Lewellyn v. Fleming, 154 F.2d
211 (10th Cir. 1946) ; Gaskill v. Roth, 151. F.2d 366 (8th Cir. 1945) ; Napier v. System
Federation No. 91, Railway Employes' Dep't, AFL, 127 F. Supp. 874 (W.D. Ky. 1955) ;
cf. Kordewick v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 181 F.2d 963 (7th Cir. 1950) ; Hughes
v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 26 L.R.R.M. 2317 (W.D. Okla. 1950); Cortez v. Ford
Motor Co., supra note 76. See also Pellicer v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 118
F. Supp. 254, 258 (S.D. Fla. 1953) ("It is significant that in cases where challenged
changes in seniority provisions did not involve racial discrimination, the courts consistently
have refused to upset the agreement") ; Kahn, supra note 67, at 378 ("Except in certain
regulated industries, the parties to collective bargaining have considerable latitude in this
situation. They may reject integration, thus submerging one group to the other for seniority
purposes, or adopt any particular integration formula which is agreed upon. The courts
have recently reaffirmed a judicial reluctance to intrude upon this aspect of the content of
collective bargaining"). Compare Brown, Employee Protection and the Regulation of Pub-
lic Utilities: Mergers, Consolidations, and Abandonnwt of Facilities in the Transtorta-
tion Industry, 63 YALE L.J. 445 (1954).
78. See S. REP. No. 1684, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1958) ; Cox, THE ROLE OF LAW
IN PRESERVING UNION DEMOCRACY (unpublished paper; copy on file in Yale Law School
Library 1958) ; Rauh, Civil Rights and Liberties and Labor Unions, 8 LAB. L.J. 874, 875
(1957).
79. See authorities cited note 8 supra.
80. See Summers, Thw Usefulness of Law in Achieving Union Democracy, 48 Am.
EcoN. REv. 44 (Supp. 1958).
81. See section entitled MINORITY INTERESTS AND MAJORITY POWER infra.
82. See Kerr, Unions and Union Leaders of Their Own Choosing, in SELcTD R.AD-
INGS 106; Summers, Legislating Union Democracy, in id. at 250.
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not in substitution for the Steele doctrine, but rather in aid of Steele's require-
ment of fair representation? An affirmative answer would be easy were analysis
to terminate at this point. But, so far, the case for legislation rests only on a
showing that the federal government has a basis in present federal law for an
interest in assuring democratic union government. Account must be taken of
another element of the problem. In many states, law already exists dealing
with internal union affairs. Perhaps this body of law goes as far as law can go
to assure democratic union government. If so, additional federal legislation
would be redundant.
STATE PROTECTION OF THE EMPLOYEE'S INTEREST IN ADmISSION, DISCIPLINE
AND ELECTIONS
Admission
California appears to be the only state which, in the absence of legislation,
has ordered a union to admit an individual to membership.8 3 Its supreme
court accomplished this result without fanfare in the recent case of Thorman
v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees.84 The litigation grew
out of a situation involving a closed union and a closed shop. Prior to Thorman,
under California's fairly mature body of common law dealing with this recurring
problem,85 an individual denied work because unfairly barred from a union or
denied full membership rights because of race, color or creed, could obtain no
more than an order compelling the union either to admit him to membership
or to refrain from enforcing its closed shop agreement against him. This is
job protection. Several states-apparently all jurisdictions in which the issue
has been litigated-protect an employee in this fashion under some circum-
stances.8 " The Thorn= court's order was not alternative in form but simply
commanded the admission of plaintiff to membership in defendant union.8 7
Unfortunately, however, the majority and dissenting judges addressed their
opinions exclusively to the question of federal pre-emption-to whether the
sections of the National Labor Relations Act separating the job from the
83. On the general subject of admissions, see Summers, The Right To Join a Union,
47 COLUVI. L. REv. 33 (1947) ; Summers, Admission Policies of Labor Unions, 61. Q.J.
EcoN. 66 (1946). Cf. Betts v. Easley, 161 Kan. 459, 169 P.2d 831 (1946).
84. 49 Cal. 2d 638, 320 P.2d 494 (1958), modifying and affirming 149 Cal. Adv. App.
116, 307 P.2d 1026 (App. Dep't 1957).
85. See Williams v. International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, 27 Cal. 2d 586, 165
P.2d 903 (1946) ; James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1.944) ; Riviello
v. Journeymen Barbers Union, 88 Cal. App. 2d 499, 199 P.2d 400 (1948).
86. See Summers, The Right To Join a Union, 47 COLUm. L. REv. 33, 44-51 (1947)
(collecting cases). See also Clark v. Curtis, 297 N.Y. 1014, 80 N.E.Zd 536 (1948). With
respect to the situation under the National Labor Relations Act and the Railway Labor
Act, see notes 59-64 supra and accompanying text. See also Ryan v. Simons, 25 L.R.R..M.
2302 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), temporary injunction, finalized, 98 N.Y.S.2d 243 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd,
277 App. Div. 1000, 100 N.Y.S.2d 18 (2d Dep't 1950), aff'd, 302 N.Y. 742, 98 N.E.2d 707,
modified, 302 N.Y. 847, 100 N.E.2d 44, cert. denied, 342 U.S. 897 (1951).
87. 49 Cal. 2d 638, 320 P.2d 494 (1958).
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union and protecting the job eliminate state court jurisdiction.88 The impor-
tance of the Thorman departure is therefore unclear, since it is impossible to say
why Thorman was.
Except for this single case, one may safely conclude that at common law the
states do not protect the employee's interest in admission to a labor union. The
explanation generally advanced for this unhappy situation is an anachronism:
because unions are private clubs, membership is a privilege and not a right.89
On the other hand, something of a right to membership is given in some juris-
dictions by statute.90 Several states have fair employment practice acts reach-
ing the most offensive type of abuse--discrimination based on race, color or
creed.91 The New York statute is a model:
"It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice .... for a labor organi-
zation, because of the age, race, creed, color or national origin of any indi-
vidual, to exclude or to expel from its membership such individual or to
discriminate in any way against any of its members or against any employer
or any individual employed by an employer.
'92
There is some statutory regulation of initiation fees,9 3 and Colorado, in addi-
tion to a Fair Employment Practice Act, has a statute which declares:
88. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958), although not
precisely in point, indicates that the majority in Thorman is quite correct on the pre-
emption issue.
89. See Frank v. National Alliance of Bill Posters, 89 N.J.L. 380, 381, 99 Atl. 134,
135 (1916) ("It would be quite impracticable for the courts to undertake to compel men
to receive into their social relationships one who was personally disagreeable whether for
a good or a bad reason. Property rights [of unincorporated unions] the courts can deal
with .... while they cannot, by a mandatory writ, intrude one man's companionship on
another"); cf. Harris v. Thomas, 217 S.W. 1068, 1076-77 (Te.X. Civ. App. 1920) ("A
voluntary association has the power to enact laws governing the admission of members and
to prescribe the necessary qualifications for membership.... Membership therein is a
privilege which the society may accord or withhold at its pleasure, with which a court
of equity will not interfere, even though the arbitrary rejection of the candidate may
prejudice his material interest").
90. See Aaron & Komaroff, supra note 62, at 452-59.
91. Alaska Sess. Laws 1953, c. 18; CoLo. Rzv. STAT. ANN. §§ 80-24-1 to -8 (Supp.
1957) ; CoNN. GEN. STAT. §§ 7400-07 (Supp. 1955) ; IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 40-2301 to -2306
(Supp. 1955) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1001 to -1008 (Supp. 1957) ; MAss. ANN.
LAws c. 151B, §§ 1-10 (Supp. 1957) ; MicH. STAT. ANN. §§ 17.458(1)-(11) (Supp. 1957);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 363.01-.07 (Supp. 1957); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18.25-1 to -28 (Supp.
1957) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-4-1 to -14 (Supp. 1957); N.Y. ExFcunvz LAW §§ 290-301 ;
ORE. Rzv. STAT. ANN. §§ 659.010-.110, 659.990 (1957); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 951-63
(Supp. 1957) ; R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 28-5-1 to -39 (Supp. 1957) ; WASH. Rv. CoDE
ANN. §§ 49.60.010-.320 (1957) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.31-.36 (1955). The Indiana, Kan-
sas and Wisconsin statutes have no enforcement procedures while the Colorado statutes
provide enforcement procedures only against public employers. See THE GRouP oF
TFAcHRS AND PRACTITIONERS OF LAROR LAW, THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION AND THE
LAW 58 (1957); Note, 68 HARV. L. REV. 685 (1955).
92. N.Y. ExEcuTivE LAW § 296(1) (b). See also N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 43, held
not to violate due process or equal protection in Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88
(1945).
93. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 447.05 (Supp. 1957) ("Labor unions . . . shall not
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"All rights of persons to join labor organizations or unions and their
rights and privileges as members thereof, should be recognized, safeguarded
and protected. No person shall be denied membership in a labor organiza-
zation or union on account of race, color, religion, sex or by any unfair or
unjust discrimination." 94
But most states have no legislation; accordingly, the employee's interest in
membership remains largely unprotected.
Discipline
A considerable and evolving body of state law protects a member from unfair
expulsion or suspension from his union.9 5 Almost wholly judge-made, this law
extends to the substance as well as the procedure of union disciplinary action.96
Unfortunately, the legal protection afforded by the judiciary seems less than
satisfactory: substantively, because of the institutional limitations of the courts;
procedurally, because the union's disciplinary bodies are often not disinterested.
The latter difficulty is apparent once it is realized that disciplinary proceedings
may be instituted against a member for conduct alleged to be contrary to union
policy,97 and brought before a tribunal controlled by the policy-making, and
hence the interested, group in the union. 98 Upon judicial review of a union
proceeding, covert bias can easily go undetected. 99
charge an initiation fee in excess of the sum of fifteen dollars) ; cf. ALA. CODE ANN. tit.
26, § 390 (Supp. 1955) (forbidding fee for work permit). The constitutionality of the
Alabama statute was upheld in Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 246 Ala.
1, 18 So. 2d 810 (1944), cert. dismissed, 325 U.S. 450 (1945).
94. CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 80-5-1(4) (Supp. 1957).
95. On the general problem of discipline, see Summers, Disciplinary Powers of Unions,
3 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 483 (1950) ; Summers, Disciplinary Procedures of Unions, 4 IND.
& LAB. REL. REv. 15 (1950) ; Summers, Legal Limitations on. Union Discipline, 64 HAgv.
L. REV. 1049 (1951) (a three part study of the disciplinary procedures prescribed in 154
international union constitutions and of union practices under them, together with 218
related court, board and arbitration decisions). See also the pioneering article of Professor
Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HARv. L. REV. 993 (1930).
96. State statutory law-the little there is-is examined in Aaron & Komaroff, Statu-
tory Regulation of Internal Union Affairs-I, 44 ILL. L. REv. 425, 451-65 (1949).
97. "[T]he number of prohibitions stated is usually relatively small, but they are fre-
quently expressed in broad and vague terms such as the provision in the United Electric
Workers Constitution punishing 'offenses against.., the general good and welfare of the
Union."' Summers, Disciplinary Powers of Unions, 3 IND. & LAB. REL. REv. 483, 493-94
(1950). See also id. at 496-98.
98. "Members who seek to challenge those in power by engaging in internal political
action may be accused of violating either general or specific constitutional provisions.
They are found guilty by a procedure which may be completely controlled by those whose
positions are threatened, and their appeal may be to officers who are political allies of the
prosecutors." Summers, Disciplinary Procedures of Unions, 4 IND. & LAB. RE._ REv. 15,
29-30 (1950).
"The typical discipline procedure includes the following major steps: making of charges
by a fellow member, serving of notice on the accused, naming of a trial committee, hold-
ing of a hearing, reporting of recommendations to the local union for vote, and appealing
to international officers and the international convention." Id. at 15.
99. See, e.g., Dragwa v. Federal Labor Union, 136 N.J. Eq. 172, 41 A.2d 32 (Ch.
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Judicial review of a substantive question requires the court to judge the issue
by some standard. The problem is where this standard is to be found. Rare
indeed is a judge whose personal conclusions will be institutionally sound. And
the court, because of its own functional limitations, cannot readily acquaint it-
self with the institution it must judge. Quite naturally-and properly-there-
fore, the standards contained in the union constitution and by-laws are the
principal guides to which a court will turn. 0 0
These documents are said to be a contract between the member and his
union. 101 Of course, they are not a negotiated contract; they are not a contract
at all.' 02 This lack of precision, however, is of small moment. The least sophis-
ticated judge in a union disciplinary proceeding knows that the action is ex
contractu only in a Pickwictdan sense. The difficulty with the approach, as
well as its strength, lies in the source of the standards. Union people know best
about unions. But they may be overprotective about their organization and
include within its constitution provisions which restrict rank-and-file opposi-
tion.10 3 Furthermore, the union member has extra-union rights and obligations
which the union constitution may ignore. Conduct which is not in the best
interest of the union, for example, may under the union constitution be subject
to discipline. Support of an allegedly anti-union congressman by a member
would by this standard seem to be an offense. Rights of citizenship must be
paramount, however, and most courts would hold void as against public policy
a clause making such support punishable.' 0 4 Thus, it is apparent that a court
1945) ; State ex rel. Dame v. LeFevre, 251 Wis. 146, 28 N.W.2d 349 (1947) (semble) ;
Note, 57 YA-aF L.J. 1302 (1948). See also Chamberlain, The Judicial Process in Labor
Unions, 10 BROOKLYN L. Ray. 145, 162-65 (1940); Summers, Legal Limitations on Union
Discipline, 64 HARv. L. REv. 1049, 1082-84 (1951).
100. See, e.g., Sanders v. International Ass'n of Bridge Workers, 235 F.2d 271 (6th
Cir. 1956) ; Otto v. Journeymen Tailors' Union, 75 Cal. 308, 17 Pac. 217 (1888).
101. "The constitution and by-laws of an unincorporated association express the terms
of a contract which define the privileges secured and the duties assumed by those who have
become members." Polin v. Kaplan, 257 N.Y. 277, 281, 177 N.E. 833, 834 (1931).
102. See Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARv. L. RLy. 1049,
1054-58 (1951).
103. See Summers, Disciplinary Powers of Unions, 3 IND. & LAB. REL. Ray. 483,
498-501 (1950). The judicial attitude towards constitutional provisions which limit poli-
tical activity within the union is not uniform. Compare Reilly v. Hogan, 32 N.Y.S.2d 864
(Sup. Ct.), af'd, 264 App. Div. 855, 36 N.Y.S.2d 423 (1st Dep't 1942), with Elfer v.
Marine Engineers Ass'n, 179 La. 383, 154 So. 32 (1934). When the member is protected-
and he often is-the judgment is likely to be grounded upon irregularities in procedures
followed by the union, see, e.g., Harris v. National Union of Marine Cooks, 98 Cal. App.
2d 733, 221 P.2d 136 (1950), rather than upon a determination that the union's substantive
standard is improper.
104. In Spayd v. Ringling Rock Lodge, 270 Pa. 67, 113 Atl. 70 (1921), the court held
that a provision in a union constitution which prohibited members from interfering with
legislative activities of the union was "against public policy and void" when invoked by the
union to expel a member who signed a petition advocating legislative action contrary to
the union's position. See also Abdon v. Wallace, 95 Ind. App. 604, 165 N.E. 68 (1929).
But cf. Harrison v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 271 S.W.2d 852 (Ky. Ct. App.
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will reach beyond the standards supplied by the union. Understandably, courts
are reluctant to do so.
Union democracy is likely to suffer from these limitations of court review,
aggravated at times by delay in obtaining judicial relief or by strict application
of the doctrine requiring exhaustion of internal union remedies. 10 5 Too often-
although not frequently because most unions must in this respect be accounted
democratic-the member who speaks his mind about intraunion affairs, who
stands up to the leadership, finds himself either unprotected by the courts, or
protected, but too late to save a delicate growth of opposition within his union.
Elections
Because union constitutions are generally explicit and right-minded in their
treatment of election procedures, the contract theory safeguards the union mem-
ber's interest in fair elections more successfully than it does in disciplinary
proceedings.' Judicial protection extends to the individual who seeks nomina-
tion or election to an office and claims an irregularity. 0 7 It is extended with
perhaps more enthusiasm to the rank-and-file member who sues in a representa-
tive capacity claiming improprieties which denied him and his fellow members
an opportunity to vote in a fair election.'0 8 In these cases, the plaintiff-member
1954). In Morgan v. Local 1150, United Elec. Workers, 16 L.R.R.M. 720 (Ill. Super. Ct.
1945), rez'd on other grounds, 331 Ill. App. 21, 72 N.E.2d 59 (1946), the court protected
the individual who supported a candidate for public office opposed by the union. But cf.
DeMille v. American Federation of Radio Artists, 31 Cal. 2d 139, 187 P.2d 769 (1947),
cert. denied, 333 U.S. 876 (1948) ; Pfoh v. Whitney, 62 N.E.2d 744 (Ohio Ct. App. 1945).
One right of citizenship generally recognized by the courts as paramount is the member's
right-if an actual controversy exists-to sue the union irrespective of a constitutional pro-
vision prohibiting such action. See Collins v. International Alliance of Theatrical Em-
ployes, 119 N.J. Eq. 230, 248, 182 Atl. 37, 46 (Ch. 1935). For cases of a somewhat dif-
ferent order, where rights of citizenship were deemed paramount, see Schneider v. Local
60, United Ass'n Journeymen Plumbers, 116 La. 270, 40 So. 700 (1905); Manning v.
Klein, 1 Pa. Super. 210 (1896).
105. "It is a well-settled rule that one who is expelled from a fraternal society cannot
resort to the courts until he has exhausted his remedies within the society. This rule has
been transferred to apply to labor unions and at times has been vigorously enforced. How-
ever, its binding effect has been severely weakened by the large number of exceptions
which the courts have created to excuse exhaustion of internal remedies." THE GROUP OF
TEACHERS AND PRACTiTIONERS OF LABOR LAw, LABOR RELATIONS AND THE LAW 913
(1953). See also Vorenberg, Exhaustion of Intraunion Renwdies as a Condition Precedent
To Appeal to the Courts, 2 LAB. L.J. 487 (1951).
106. See DANKERT, CONTEMPORARY UNIoNISS IN THE UNITm STATES 206-16 (1948);
Shister, Trade-Union Government: A Formal Analysis, 60 Q.J. EcoN. 78, 90 (1945);
Summers, Union Powers and Workers' Rights, 49 MIcH. L. REv. 805, 830 (1951).
107. See, e.g., Lacey v. O'Rourke, 147 F. Supp. 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). The plaintiff,
before he can obtain relief, must exhaust his intraunion remedies. See Harrison v. O'Neill,
26 L.R.R.M. 2294 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950).
108. See, e.g., Collins v. International Alliance of Theatrical Employees, 119 N.J. Eq.
230, 182 Atl. 37 (Ch. 1935) ; Fisher v. Kempter, 25 L.R.R.M. 2188, 2189 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1949).
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is claiming an intangible sort of right; the claim in the past has given courts,
viewing labor unions as private social clubs, some trouble.10 9 The analogy to
the club generally tends to restrain judicial intervention, for courts have often
said that a "property right" must exist to justify their intrusion. 110 While
"property right" is, of course, an extraordinarily vague concept, expulsion
from a union is nearer the archetype evoked by the phrase than an unfair elec-
tion proceeding."' But it seems probable today that most courts will follow the
New York judge who manifested his wisdom in the course of an opinion when
he said: "[A] labor union is not a social club .... The success of the result is
dependent upon the responsiveness and ability of the leader of the union....
If a member has a 'property right' in his position on the roster, I think he has an
equally enforcible property right in the election of men who will represent
him ....
This adumbration of state law has been adequate, I should think, to justify
venturing one inescapable as well as another possibly debatable conclusion.
First, the states are deeply involved in the regulation of internal union affairs.
Second, state action in the form of legislation and judge-made law has not, in
the majority of jurisdictions, served to discharge the federal government's
obligation to the individual employee.
Recapitulation may help justify this latter conclusion. State law has been
surveyed to determine whether it helps secure the worker fair representation
in the negotiation and administration of the collective agreement by protecting
his freedom within the union to make felt his economic needs. The thought
has been that if the individual can communicate these needs through a demo-
cratic political process within the union, the Steele doctrine will be reinforced
and the federal government's duty to the individual, imposed by the majority-
rule concept of collective bargaining, will more nearly be satisfied. The survey
has been concerned with admission, discipline and election in the belief that
employee protection in these three areas is both susceptible to legislation and
of maximum importance-even though such protection may not, by itself, be
enough for success. But state protection of the employee's interest in admission
is, as indicated, inadequate. Indeed, it is by and large nonexistent. While the
situation is more encouraging in the area of discipline and even more so as to
elections, standards come mostly from the unions themselves and hence may be
unsatisfactory. Furthermore, union tribunals may be biased, and the law's
delay intolerable.
109. Compare Carey v. International Brotherhood of Paper Makers, 123 Misc. 680,
206 N.Y. Supp. 73 (Sup. Ct. 1924), with Talton v. Behncke, 199 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1952).
110. See cases cited notes 109 supra, 112 infra.
111. "The right to participate in the establishment and management of the govern-
ment of the union through voting for its officers and the privilege of becoming a candidate
for an office therein is a political right incident to the privilege of membership. It involves
no property right . .. ." State ex rel. Givens v. Superior Court, 233 Ind. 235, 240, 117
N.E.2d 553, 556 (1954).
112. Dusing v. Nuzzo, 177 Misc. 35, 37, 29 N.Y.S.2d 882, 884 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
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Before action upon these conclusions is warranted, however, a further area
of inquiry must be pursued. The labor movement itself may be responding
and, through publicly coerced private action, may reduce the pressure on the
federal government to legislate about union democracy.
PRIVATE REGULATION OF UNION DEmOCRACY
Two events have occurred recently within the union movement which should
encourage the proponent of union democracy. First, two important unions,
the Auto Workers and the Upholsterers, have established review boards staffed
by wholly independent citizens of stature in the community, and generally of
expertness in the labor field."13 These boards have broad jurisdiction, includ-
ing the power to review internal disciplinary proceedings. 114 There is every
reason to expect that both of these private boards will offer the union member
protection comparable to any that might be provided by legislation. There is
reason to hope, though not to expect, that other unions less democratic in
character will follow the lead of these pioneering organizations.
Second, the AFL-CIO Executive Council approved on May 23, 1957, an
Ethical Practices Code for the combined labor organization, titled Union Demo-
cratic Processes, dealing with some of the problems with which this Article is
concerned." 07 The first provision of the Code is of special interest.
"Each member of a union should have the right to full and free partici-
pation in union self-government. This should include the right (a) to
vote periodically for his local and national officers, either directly by ref er-
endum vote or through delegate bodies, (b) to honest elections, (c) to
113. The Upholsterers Review Board was established in May 1954. Appointees to
the Board at that time were Archibald Cox of the Harvard Law School, chairman;
Nathan P. Feinsinger, University of Wisconsin Law School; Paul M. Herzog, then As-
sistant Dean of the Harvard School of Public Administration; Father Leo C. Brown of
St. Louis University; J. Benton Gillingham, Assistant Director of the University of
Washington Institute of Labor Economics; Father Dennis J. Comey of the Institute of
Industrial Relations at St. Joseph's College; Clark Kerr, Chancellor of the University of
California; Curtis J. Bok, Judge of the Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia; and Joseph
D. Lohman, Former Chairman of the Illinois State Parole Commission. See 34 L.R.R.M.
65 (1954).
The United Auto Workers Appeal Board was created on April 12, 1957, at that union's
sixteenth convention. Six persons were then appointed to the board: Rabbi Morris Adler
of Detroit; Monsignor George C. Higgins of Washington, D.C.; Clark Kerr; Edwin E.
Witte, University of Wisconsin; Wade H. McCree, Judge of the Detroit Circuit Court; and
Bishop G. Bromley Oxnam of Washington, D.C. See 39 L.R.R.M. 42 (1957). For a re-
cent discussion of its activities, see Bus. Week, July 12, 1958, pp. 81-88.
114. See 34 L.R.R.M. 65 (1954); 39 L.R.R.M. 41-42 (1957). The UAW Board has
jurisdiction to review both the fairness of the union's treatment of an individual's griev-
ance and the union's disciplinary action. The only case decided thus far by the Uphol-
sterers' Board was apparently of the former type. In addition to its status as an appellate
tribunal, the UAW Board has a "watchdog" function. Ibid.
115. See Code VI, Union Democratic Processes, in AFL-CIO CoDS OF ETHICAl.
PRAcTiCEs 41-45 (1957).
13491958]
HeinOnline -- 67 Yale L.J. 1349 1957-1958
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
stand for and hold office, subject only to fair qualifications uniformly im-
posed, (d) to voice his views as to the method in which the union's affairs
should be conducted." 116
Subsequent sections of this Code deal with these questions in a more specific
manner.117 Although it is impossible to say what impact the Code will have
upon democracy within the unions affiliated with the AFL-CIO, any positive
effect is bound to be favorable. Moreover, the Code may be of importance, or
at least is potentially important, in another context-judicial review of internal
union proceedings.
One of the principal problems confronting courts reviewing internal union
proceedings is, as has already been suggested, the unavailability of standards
by which to judge the propriety of union performance. Courts begin with the
union constitution and often go no further, for once beyond the constitution
they are left with only such vague guides as "natural justice" or "public poli-
cy. "118 This AFL-CIO Ethical Practices Code may well supply a standard
to which the courts can properly turn, a standard which, it should be observed,
fits with but a slight push into the traditional judicial approach to these prob-
lems when the union litigant is affiliated with the AFL-CIO. Two theories are
possible. Under one, since unions in the federation are expected to comply
with the Codes of Ethical Practices promulgated by the Committee on Ethical
Practices and approved by the AFL-CIO Executive Council,119 these codes
can be viewed as designed for the benefit of union members in much the same
fashion as the promise in a third-party beneficiary contract is for the benefit
of one intended to be the recipient of its performance. 20 Under the other, be-
cause a union affiliated with the AFL-CIO is expected to change its rules if
they are contrary to the standards established by the Ethical Practices Code,12 '
a union which fails to amend its rules and remains in the federation may be
presumed to have found its rules in compliance with the Code. This presump-
tion would enable a court to view the "contract" between the union and its
members as incorporating the federation's Code. The chief merit of either ap-
proach is that standards to which the union must conform are supplied by
organized labor itself.
The courts have given no indication that they are about to adopt either
theory. On the other hand, there is no reason to suspect that either will be
rejected if argued, especially since an increasing concern for the individual can
be detected in the judicial handling of internal union problems.'
22
116. Id. at 43.
117. Id. at 43-45.
118. See notes 100-04 supra and accompanying text.
119. See AFL-CIO Resolution on Ethical Practices, in AFL-CIO CODES OF ETHICL
PRAcricEs 7 (1957) ; Code VI, Union Deiwcratic Processes, in id. at 43.
120. See 4 CoRDIN, CONTRACTS §§ 772-81 (1951).
121. Code VI, § 12, Union Democratic Processes, in AFL-CIO CODES OF ETHICAL
PAcricEs 45 (1957).
122. See, e.g., Madden v. Atkins, 4 N.Y.2d 283, 151 N.E.2d 73 (1958).
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Be that as it may, it seems clear that the federal government's obligation to
the worker, governed by the majority-rule doctrine, remains substantially
unsatisfied by these encouraging activities of as yet unknown consequence
within the union movement. These activities may mean, however, that the
federal government should wait before it acts. Much can be said for keeping
union government as independent of federal or state regulation as possible.
One of the more sophisticated observers of these problems, Clark Kerr, has
recently suggested the importance to a democratic society of plural centers of
power, and the importance to this concept of independent unions. 23 But he and
most other disinterested and enlightened commentators agree that limited regu-
lation of union government-whether state or federal-is not incompatible
with the goal of plural power centers and may be necessary to protect the indi-
vidual. 124 Indeed, as has been noted, the states are engaged in regulating dis-
cipline, elections and to some extent admission policies, as well as other inter-
nal union practices.125 In all probability, no matter what the union movement
does, some regulation in these areas will continue to be necessary.
The case for intelligent federal legislation in the fields of admission, disci-
pline and election thus seems complete. Other factors, however, tend to under-
mine the desirability of such federal action.
FEDERALISII AND LABOR UNION GOVERNMENT
As a matter of constitutional law, power unquestionably resides in Congress
to legislate on admission, discipline and elections. 26 The commerce clause
reaches these areas as surely as it does the regulation of collective bargaining.
There is little question that Congress manifested its great wisdom when it exer-
cised its power and enacted the National Labor Relations Act.' 2T Collective
bargaining is a subject which demands uniform treatment. The same cannot
be said with any assurance, however, about the aspects of union government
under present discussion.
"Uniform" has at least two connotations. One concerns a policy which must
be consistent throughout the nation if it is to be successful. The word is used
123. Kerr, Unions and Union Leaders of Their OzWe Choosing, in SELEcTED READINGS
106, 109. See also LIPSET, TROW & COLEMAN, UNION DEMOCRACY 411-12 (1956).
124. Kerr, supra note 123, at 117-18. See Statement of Archibald Cox, Hearings Be-
fore the Subcommittee on Union Financial and Administrative Practices and Procedures
of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 362 (1958) ;
Statement of Clyde Summers, id. at 594. See also Summers, The Usefulness of Law in
Achieving Union Dewcracy, 48 Am. ECON. REv. 44 (Supp. 1958). But cf. Dunlop, The
Public Interest in Internal Affairs of Unions, 1957 A.B.A. SECTION OF LAB. REI. LAW 10,
16-17.
125. For a discussion and case presentation of the entire area of state regulation of
internal union affairs, see THE GRouP OF TEACHiERS AND PRACTITIONERS OF LABOR LAW,
LABOR RELATIONS AND THE LAW 851-1007 (1953).
126. Indeed, no one seems to have suggested otherwise.
127. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1952).
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in this sense when it is said that the law of collective bargaining must be "uni-
form." It would not do for an employer in Michigan to have to respect the de-
mands of his employees to bargain collectively if a similarly situated employer
in Illinois were free to extract enforceable "yellow dog" contracts from his
workers and to decline to bargain with anyone. Michigan might find itself with
very little industry, a sure consequence of nonuniformity until Michigan em-
ployers came to realize that collective bargaining is mutually advantageous. 1-28
The other connotation has to do with predictability and its importance to the
regulated individuals and organizations. If one were to conclude that a uniform
law should be applied by the courts in suits for breach of a collective bargaining
agreement, one would probably have this consideration in mind; for it can per-
suasively be argued that the primary rights and duties of parties to a labor
contract should not be governed by two independent and possibly conflicting
bodies of law.1 29 A choice of law issue would greatly complicate decision mak-
ing by the parties and might invite dispute. In the event of litigation, if courts
disagreed, this issue could induce forum shopping. This is a real problem today
because section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act 130 creates a federal substantive
law of labor contracts. 131 If the federal law does not pre-empt that of the
states-and whether it does remains uncertain-it will exist in competition with
state law.
132
Neither of these connotations of "uniform" properly attaches to a statement
that problems of admission, expulsion and election require uniform treatment.
Except for the governmental obligation flowing from the Case principle of ma-
jority rule,133 no national policy turns upon such treatment.' M The opinion
has been voiced, however, that uniformity is necessary to protect unions from
a multiplicity of possibly conflicting rules. 13  The reasoning along this line
is most persuasive when applied to the regulation of union elections, particularly
the election of international officers. 136 To subject an international union which
128. Even with uniform law, the runaway shop is not unknown. The case of Jacob
H. Klotz, 13 N.L.R.B. 746 (1939), tells a story of a flight from New York City in the
early days of the act.
129. See McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal. 2d
47, 61-63, 315 P.2d 322, 329-30 (1957).
130. 61 STAT. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1952).
131.. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) ; General Elec. Co.
v. Local 205, United Elec. Workers, 353 U.S. 547 (1957); Goodall-Sanford, Inc. v. Local
1802, United Textile Workers, AFL, 353 U.S. 550 (1957).
132. Compare McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal.
2d 47, 315 P.2d 322 (1957), with Associated Tel. Co. v. Communications Workers, CIO,
114 F. Supp. 334 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
133. See text at notes 25-39 supra.
134. But see Cox, THE ROLE OF LAw IN PRESERVING UNION DEmOCRACY 33 (unpub-
lished paper; copy on file in Yale Law School Library 1958). See also text at note 142
infra.
135. See S. REP. No. 1684, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, 12, 13 (1958).
136. "There is a great need for uniformity in the laws governing union elections. In-
ternational and national unions operate in many States. It would be confusing, unduly
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operates throughout the country to the laws of the several states would lead
to intolerable confusion within the union-so the argument runs-were the
union to attempt good faith compliance with all the requirements of forty-
eight or more laws. Furthermore, the member who wished to challenge an
election would have the entire country in which to shop for a favorable forum.
But reported cases lend no support to this concern13 7  Should the problem
arise, there is no reason to suspect that conflict of laws doctrine is too impover-
ished to resolve the difficulties. The law of the jurisdiction in which a given
international union has its headquarters would seem a likely choice for the
source of applicable law. 138 Although the conflicts rule might take a little time
to work itself pure, this sort of problem is an ancient one in our law. Concern
about it in this area almost before the problem arises seems strange indeed. 39
burdensome, and often impossible for them to comply with a variety of election laws. The
same considerations apply, with somewhat lesser force, to local unions, a considerable num-
ber of which function in several States. Also, the burden of checking compliance is likely
to fall upon the international union." Id. at 13.
This report accompanied S. 3974, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), providing for federal
election law, which was passed by the Senate, see 104 CONG. RIc. 10381 (daily ed. June 17,
1958). An argument can certainly be made that, if federal legislation is necessary, it should
occupy the field to the exclusion of state election laws. But the above quoted portion of the
report, though ostensibly directed at the question of pre-emption, seems more fundamentally
concerned with the primary issue of whether there should be any federal election legislation
at all. The remaining sentences of the quoted paragraph make this clearer "It is easier
to enforce one uniform rule than a crazy quilt of State legislation and court decisions.
Ill-considered State laws would interfere with the national labor policy. Too stringent laws
would handicap unions in dealing with employers. Too frequent elections may keep a
union in a state of turmoil." S. REP. No. 1684, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1958). For an
examination of these latter considerations, see text at notes 141-50 infra.
137. The Teamsters litigation-Cunningham v. International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, 40 L.R.R.M. 2650 (D.D.C.) (preliminary injunction preventing election of officers
granted), injunction stayed, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Cunningham, 40
L.R.R.M. 2653 (D.C. Cir.), aff'd sub iwm. Cunningham v. English, 78 Sup. Ct. 3 (1957) ;
Cunningham v. English, 40 L.R.R.M. 2693 (D.D.C.) (temporary restraining order pro-
hibiting elected officials from assuming office), preliminary injunction issued, 41 L.R.R.-M.
2022 (D.D.C. 1957)-and Ford v. Curran, 36 L.R.R.M. 2407 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955), seem
to be the only reported cases in which an election of international union officers was chal-
lenged. Both, but particularly the Teamsters cases, have many difficulties, none of which
are connoted by either meaning of the word "uniform"
138. The several decisions cited note 137 supra do not consider the choice of law
question. If unions were incorporated, the applicable law would be that of the place of in-
corporation. See RESTATEmENT, CONFLICr OF LAws § 183 (1934). See also id. at § 342
(obligations of partners as between themselves determined by law of the place where agree-
ment of partnership made). The international union's headquarters as the appropriate state
for choice of law purposes is undoubtedly a somewhat arbitrary selection. But the resolu-
tion of such questions in a definite manner always involves an element of arbitrariness.
Since, however, the state where the union has its headquarters will probably have the
largest interest in the dispute, application of its law would seem least capricious.
139. Should conflicts difficulties arise, an international union might fully protect itself
by complying with the law of the state which was most restrictive, that is, the state law
which attempted-perhaps too vigorously-to compel frequent and fair elections.
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If the experience yet to come ultimately indicates that the conflict of laws diffi-
culty cannot easily be resolved, or if for some other reason now unforeseen,
federal law should be needed, then, of course, we must have it. But that is not
today's problem, and today there is no reason to suspect that it will be tomor-
row's.
Accommodation by a union to diverse state laws on questions of local elec-
tions, disciplinary proceedings and admissions present even less difficulty.
These are problems in which only a single state is likely to have any large in-
terest. Most locals are situated in one state-the state where the employee
works. In almost any situation, therefore, under the conflicts rule of almost
any jurisdiction, the state law which will apply to the primary rights and
duties of the parties may be forecast with great certainty.140 To be sure, an
occasional case may present difficulties. One can easily pose nice problems.
But the probability of difficulty is too remote to require attention at this time.
Another line of argument not unrelated to uniformity is sometimes ad-
vanced in support of the contention that federal legislation is necessary. It
is simply that present state regulation is unsatisfactory, and that new state
legislation may be unwise.1 41 If this argument is carried to its extreme, and
the view taken that states are likely to behave in an altogether irresponsible
fashion, the position that the national labor policy of collective bargaining re-
quires uniform federal regulation of union democracy becomes more plaus-
ible. State law could be so restrictive as to injure the collective bargaining
function of the regulated union. 142 The weakness of this argument is that
such state legislation would probably be invalid under the supremacy clause
of the Constitution and present federal law. The Supreme Court has con-
sistently held that states may not interfere with the rights of self-organization
and collective bargaining given employees by section seven of the National
Labor Relations Act.143
Quite apart from the uniformity problem, however, there is an immediate
and often substantial appeal in the straightforward suggestion that we need
federal regulation because state law is not all it might be now and may not be
all it should be tomorrow. The short answer for purposes of this Article is to
invoke a limitation enunciated at the outset and to suggest that this is beyond
the present scope of inquiry.144 The suggestion assumes that political pres-
sures will result in wise federal legislation and in unwise state legislation.
Nevertheless, a longer answer to this argument is possible, one which ques-
tions the political assumption only collaterally although that assumption is
140. Although the case law is extensive, choice of law problems do not appear, sug-
gesting, perhaps, that it is not much of a problem.
141. See S. REP. No. 1684, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1958) : "Ill-considered State laws
would interfere with the national labor policy. Too stringent laws would handicap unions
in dealing with employers. Too frequent elections may keep a union in a state of turmoil."
142. Ibid.
143. See, e.g., Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
144. See text at note 12 supra.
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hardly beyond direct attack.1 4 r This answer may be worth stating without
detailed development.
Argument grounded in the judgment that state labor law is likely to be un-
wise manifests more than anything else an impatience with the federal
system and a lack of skepticism which, if present, might find some comfort in
that ancient institution. Two basic justifications for a federal system are found
in the phrases "fractionation of power" and "the need for experimentation."
If these are slogans without substance, then, of course, federal law should en-
ter the area under discussion and every important area in which law has a role
to play. If these phrases are rooted in reason as well as tradition, they tend to
support a contrary conclusion. They introduce into the decision-making pro-
cess two new considerations which may outweigh the judgment that federal
action is needed to ensure wiser labor legislation. Indeed, the experimentation
point, if valid, in fact suggests that one should not always be dogmatic about
the social desirability of particular legislation, especially in a developing area
of law.
"Fractionation of power" assumes that the individual in a democratic so-
ciety will be freer in the long run if power in that society is diversified.146 If
145. The superiority over existing state law, for example, of the election provisions in
S. 3974, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., tit. 3 (1958), see note 136 supra, is questionable. Section
303 of this bill would wipe out existing state law under which an individual member may
institute suit when his union has failed to comply with the election procedures of the union
constitution. If he can prove his case, in most jurisdictions he can obtain relief appropriate
to the circumstances. See Collins v. International Alliance of Theatrical Employees, 119
N.J. Eq. 230, 182 Atl. 37 (Ch. 1935) (ordering supervised election with interim court
control of union); Fisher v. Kempter, 25 L.R.R.M. 2189 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1949) (temporary
injunction prohibiting installation of officers) ; see also Lacey v. O'Rourke, 147 F. Supp.
922 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (same). The federal statute, though purporting to do the opposite,
would seem substantially to limit protection presently available to the individual member.
Under this pre-emptive legislation, all action is channeled through the Secretary of Labor,
who is to investigate a member's charge and bring suit "if he finds probable cause to be-
lieve that a violation of this Act has occurred . . . ." § 302(b): No review of the Secre-
tary's decision is provided for in the statute. Under § 302(a), moreover, a "challenged
election shall be presumed valid pending a final decision thereon ... and in the interim
the affairs of the organization shall be conducted by the officers elected. . . ." This require-
ment would seem to limit the court's flexibility in fashioning a decree. Thus, were the
Secretary to deem the institution of suit appropriate, both lapse of time and the statutory
presumption might limit the court's ability to grant full relief.
The Senate's "superior wisdom" is further demonstrated by § 305 (a) of the bill, which
provides:
"No person who has been convicted of any felony shall serve as an officer, director,
trustee, member of any executive committee or similar governing body, business agent,
manager or paid organizer of a labor organization engaged in an industry affecting com-
merce, prior to the restoration of his right to vote in elections held under the laws of the
State of his legal residence."
146. The concept is not limited to state-federal problems; it applies to all power groups
in society. The state, however, is a particularly important power center because, to some
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the federal government legislates about union democracy, it exercises its in-
fluence in a new region of societal activity. In the short run, this legislation
may increase the freedom of the individual employee.14 7 But the states have
also been excited by the disclosures of the McClellan Committee.1 48 Fear of
future state action probably springs from a belief that states will go too far
in protecting the individual rather than not far enough, with resulting injury
to unions. 49 A partial answer to this concern has been noted. The supremacy
clause, together with section seven of the National Labor Relations Act, largely
prohibits the states from interfering with unions as collective bargaining
agents.' 50 A second answer recalls the virtues of experimentation in this area.
No one really knows how far we can or should go in attempting to legislate
union democracy.
These several considerations of federalism, however, should not alone suf-
fice to deter congressional legislation in the fields of admission, discipline and
election, if such legislation can substantially discharge the government's obli-
gation to the individual employee as imposed by the majority-rule principle of
Case. Unfortunately, it cannot.
MINORITY INTERESTS AND MAJORITY POWER
Suppose Steele and the other Negro firemen had been members of the
Brotherhood-outnumbered, to be sure, by the white members. Is it likely
that people with the mentality which drew the invidious color distinction
when Steele was outside would have behaved differently if Steele had been
inside and had protested? Perhaps; but not very likely. Would not the re-
sults probably have been the same even if the Negro firemen had had full ad-
mission, discipline and election rights within the Brotherhood?
When the A company acquired the B company and the union negotiated an
degree at least, it is itself democratic and, accordingly, representative. "Fractionation of
power," in its broadest outlines, is summarized with special reference to labor unions in
LipsET, TRow & COLEMAN, UNION DEmOCRACY 411 (1956): "The emphasis in this book
on the undemocratic character of most labor unions is not designed to negate the general
proposition of the political pluralists that trade unions, like many other internally oligarchic
organizations, serve to sustain political democracy in the larger society. As many political
observers have made clear, many internally dictatorial organizations operate to protect the
interests of their members by checking the encroachments of other groups. Democracy in
large measure rests on the fact that no one group is able to secure such a basis of power
and command over the total allegiance of a majority of the population that it can effectively
suppress or deny the claims of groups it opposes."
147. See text following note 112 sapra.
148. In New York, in September 1957, Governor Harriman named a committee, with
Professor Clyde Summers as chairman, to inquire into similar problems and to make
recommendations for state legislation. The committee issued its first interim report on
February llth. GovmoR's ComiTrEE ON IMPROPER LABOR AND MANAGEMENT PRACTIcEs,
INTERIM REPORT (1958).
149. See note 141 supra.
150. See note 143 supra and accompanying text.
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agreement which treated the B employees as new help for purposes of senior-
ity, would it have made any difference if the old B employees had been mem-
bers of the union at the time of the negotiations? In the famous Trailmobile
case, it certainly would have made no difference. And the union was one
generally regarded as responsible and fair.15 '
Jennings v. Jenn1ings 152 is a notorious case in which open membership
and democratic procedures did not prevent the union from negotiating an
agreement unfair to a nonracial minority group. Distribution of accrued wages
was the issue in that case. The minority seems to have been entitled to most
of the money. It went mostly to the majority.
The point of this discussion is not to suggest that the likelihood of fair repre-
sentation by the majority union does not increase when the employee has an
opportunity to communicate his economic needs through a democratic politi-
cal process within the union. The point is much more modest, merely that the
e.xistence of an open union, fair discipline and free elections, in combination with
the present Steele doctrine, is not enough substantially to discharge the federal
government's obligation to individual employees. When this fact is added to the
considerations of federalism sketched earlier, the wisdom of federal legislation
in the admission, discipline and election fields becomes doubtful. The case
against federal intrusion into these areas would be complete if one could find a
better way to discharge the federal obligation which at the same time more
fully respected the role of the states.
FAIR REPRESENTATION
The quest for an alternative to federal regulation of union admission, disci-
pline and election policies is best begun at the point where the very real federal
interest in these questions was first discerned. The Steele doctrine represents
an attempt by the courts to discharge the government's obligation to the indi-
vidual employee living within a system governed by the majority-rule prin-
ciple of collective bargaining. A duty of fair representation is imposed upon
the union; a corresponding right, which can be vindicated in the courts, is be-
stowed upon the individual employee. If Steele fully protected the individual,
concern with problems of federal regulation of union democracy would be un-
necessary; for the need to safeguard the minority employee is the principal
valid reason, almost the only reason, for present national interest in internal
union democracy.
Steele fails because courts, unable to find standards by which to test the fair-
ness of economic distinctions in collective agreements, apply a heavy presump-
tion of legality to union action.'6 3 This is similar to the presumption of con-
stitutionality federal courts accord to state action in the economic sphere-a
presumption rooted in an altogether different relationship. 5 4
151. See note 67 supra.
152. 91 N.E.2d 899 (Ohio Ct. App. 1949).
153. See notes 65-77 supra and accompanying text.
154. Ibid.
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But the fact that states and unions are very different institutions with dif-
ferent sources of power does not mean that this presumption of legality is it-
self irrational when applied by courts to union action of the type under con-
sideration. One reason for the presumption of constitutionality is the institu-
tional limitation of the courts. They are not equipped to pass on the wisdom
of a state's economic decisions. 15 5 Nor are they equipped to evaluate the wis-
dom of a union's collective bargaining judgments. 5 6 And yet, this understand-
able judicial restraint, when applied to union action, leaves unsatisfied the
federal obligation to the individual employee.
If the courts are not institutionally capable of discharging the government's
obligations in a satisfactory fashion, why not an institution which is? This
sounds deceptively easy. Can any government agency, no matter how expert,
do more than pass upon the rational nature of distinctions drawn in the collec-
tive bargaining process without seriously jeopardizing the process of collective
bargaining itself? The answer to the question when put in this fashion is yes.
But it takes much less sensitivity to the process than was possessed by a Harry
Shulman to realize just how intricate are the problems involved.1 '7
Collective bargaining is a vital institution because it is capable of adjusting
to the complicated and changing demands of modern industrial society. It can
accommodate itself to all industries and firms and to the ever-shifting condi-
tions and problems within these industries and their subdivisions. Collective
bargaining matures in a given context as personal traditions become estab-
lished. It demands of its participants a continuous and intimate relationship;
and wherever it appears, it is unique. 58 These considerations have led the
disinterested experts-professional arbitrators, arbitrators who teach and
teachers who arbitrate-as well as labor people, to distrust outside intrusion,
particularly government intrusion. 5 9 There can be no challenging the wis-
dom of this instinct. In so far as possible, collective bargaining must remain
private.
The difficulty is that, when protection of the individual is at stake, exclud-
ing the public is impossible except at a very high price. The federal govern-
ment can disregard its obligation to the individual employee. Or it can at-
tempt to discharge the obligation by moving into the area of union govern-
ment. Experience indicates, however, that the move will not achieve its goal,
155. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 283-85 (1932) (dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis).
156. See Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VI.L. L. RE,. 151, 167 (1957).
157. His peroration-beautifully communicating his sensitivity-is found in Shulman,
Reason, Contract, and Law in- Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV. 999 (1955).
158. See, generally, CHAMBERLAIN, CoLLEcrTIVE BARGAINING (1951) ; Cox, The Duty
To Bargain in- Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1401 (1958).
159. See, e.g., TAYLOR, GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (1948);
Cox & Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the National Labor Relations Board,
63 HARV. L. REv. 389 (1950); Cox & Dunlop, The Duty To Bargain Collectivel, During
the Term of an Existing Agreement, 63 HARV. L. Ry. 1097 (1950) ; Shulman, supra note
157.
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while considerations of federalism suggest that this area ought to be left to the
states. Finally, the federal government can intrude a little more into the col-
lective bargaining process-a little more because it is now and long has been
a participant in that process. The NLRB has the power, which it exercises,
to regulate collective bargaining procedures and to help determine the sub-
stantive matters discussed at the bargaining table. 160 If the Board were in-
vested with the power to review the merits of union decisions in this area, the
intrusion would admittedly be more extensive than ever before. The Board
for the first time would be concerned, although in a limited way, with the sub-
stantive validity of collective bargaining decisions. But if the standards applied
were fashioned with wisdom, the consequences to the institution of collective
bargaining would be acceptable.
The task of formulating and applying standards is not easy. Neither was
the job of the NLRB in the mid-thirties. The Board had to make sense out
of the unfair labor practice provisions 161 and out of the representation pro-
visions of the Wagner Act.162 Responsibility for establishing the appropriate
bargaining unit and for infusing meaning into the requirement of the duty to
bargain forced the Board into a continuing examination of collective bargain-
ing practices. 16 3 If the Board-and because of this experience it seems to be
the proper agency 164-were to review union decisions claimed to be violations
of the duty of fair representation, the scope of this examination would have to
be expanded. For the standards to be applied in such cases should come from
collective bargaining practices.
These practices, or more accurately, the union's practice of collective bar-
gaining, in part reflects the expectations of employees. In turn the employees'
160. See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958); In-
land Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1.949) ;
NLRB v. J. H. Allison & Co., 165 F.2d 766 (6th Cir. 1948) ; Truitt Mfg. Co., 110 N.L.R:B.
856 (1954), enforcement denied, 224 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1955), rev'd, 351 U.S. 149 (1956);
Cox, The Duty To Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HAuv. L. Ray. 1401 (1958) ; Cox & Dunlop,
Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the National Labor Relations Board, 63 HARv. L.
Rav. 389 (1950) ; Findling & Colby, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the National
Labor Relations Board-Another View, 51 COLUm. L. REv. 170 (1951).
161. 49 STAT. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1952).
162. 49 STAT. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1952).
163. See authorities cited note 160 supra.
164. The NLRB should perform this function for unions regulated by the Railway
Labor Act, as well as for those now subject to the National Labor Relations Act.
The FCC, the CAB, and to a much lesser extent, the ICC, get involved in seniority
problems growing out of mergers, consolidations and similar transactions in the transporta-
tion and communication industries. The FCC and the GAB have taken an active role in
resolving such disputes. See, e.g., Kent v. CAB, 204 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 826 (1953). See, generally, Brown, Employee Protection and the Regulation of
Public Utilities: Mergers, Consolidations, and Abandonment of Facilities in the Trans-
portation Industry, 63 YAIE L.J. 445 (1954); Kahn, Seniority Problems in Business
Mergers, 8 IND. & LAB. RaL. Ray. 360, 365-71. (1955). A general vesting of jurisdiction
in the NLRB, as suggested in text, ought not to interfere with these agencies.
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expectations are created by past practices1 65 Each employee has expectations.
He anticipates from his own experience and the experience of others that the
union, if it is doing its job will, when representing him in the negotiation and
administration of the agreement, treat him in a particular way or ways vis-a-
vis other employees in the unit. Since a particular employee may be unreason-
able, single expectations are not in themselves important in creating standards.
There is, however, a sense of the employee community on these questions
which institutionally is reasonable. This "employee-community expectation,"
to coin what is perhaps an infelicitous phrase, is significant. Indeed, might
not the Board, in a dispute between union and individual involving fair repre-
sentation, fruitfully test the union's performance by just such a standard? 66
To suggest a standard of this sort is one thing. Quite another is determin-
ing what the employee expectation is in a given case. But is it really asking
too much? Are not most decision-making bodies expected to perform similar
tasks of similar difficulty? Courts are constantly trying to discover what a
reasonable man in the position of plaintiff or defendant would have done or
would have thought. 1 7 Judges are generalists. When their reasonable man
comes from a specialized community, they may be in trouble. Nevertheless,
they are often-and sometimes unwisely-asked to go ahead.' 68 The Labor
Board member is a specialist, or becomes one after appointment. The expecta-
tions he must ascertain under the suggested approach belong to the communi-
ty with which he is especially familiar. He has all the aids necessary-a
specialized bar, the use of expert testimony, official notice and a learned staff.
We make too much of judging if we suggest that this task is too great.
The expectations of the employee community vary with the nature of the
interest at stake.' 69 Back pay, for example, is of a different and higher order
than position on a seniority list. Seniority is important, but the expectation
is not that seniority is immutable. A right to back wages would probably be
so considered. The extent of reliance as well as the nature of the interest is an
important related factor which influences the intensity of the expectation. The
union in bargaining for seniority in the first collective agreement would have
more freedom than in bargaining for discriminatory changes of status after
a system of seniority had been established.
If the suggested approach were employed in the situation where company
A acquired company B, and the B employees were treated as new employees
165. Indeed, in part, employees choose to be represented by a union because of ex-
pectations based upon past performance.
166. Compare the language and tone of the opinion in Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman,
345 U.S. 330, 338-43 (1953).
167. See, e.g., New York Trust Co. v. Island Oil & Transp. Corp., 34 F.2d 655 (2d
Cir. 1929) (contract) ; Gulf Refining Co. v. Williams, 183 Miss. 723, 185 So. 234 (1938)
(tort).
163. Cf. Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The
Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1, 22-25 (1957).
169. Compare Note, 65 HARv. L. Rzv. 490, 495-500 (1952).
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for the purpose of seniority, the union would be in breach of duty.1 70 Al-
though position on the seniority ladder is subject to revision, bargaining for
its total elimination seems clearly outside the expectation of the employee com-
munity. Some sort of dovetailing would accordingly be required to approxi-
mate community expectation.
171
"Employee-community expectation," while the principal standard for re-
view, should not be the only test employed by the Board. The dynamics of
industrial relations demand that the union be permitted to depart from accepted
community standards. But when it does so and is called to task by an unhappy
employee, it should be required to come forward and demonstrate that the
departure was in good faith and for good reason.
Although increasing the scope of review has the unfortunate consequence
of putting the government more prominently into collective bargaining, it can
benefit that institution as well as discharge the government's obligation to
the individual employee. A good deal of controversy in the literature concerns
the extent to which the union should have complete control over the processing
of grievances, arbitration and litigation under the labor contract.172 The con-
troversy centers about protection of the individual. As an institutional matter,
exclusive control by the unions would almost always seem desirable because
many disputes under an agreement have implications which are much broader
than the interest of the individual worker. Resolution of a dispute may thus
establish a rule for the future far more important to the union than the im-
mediate settlement is to the employee. In this sort of situation, where control
is diversified, the results may be unfortunate. 178 But exclusive control in the
union would today leave the employee with no protection except the Steele
doctrine. This is clearly not protection enough where complicated problems in-
volving administration of the agreement are in issue. 74 If the scope of review
of the union's action were broadened, however, the individual might well be
adequately protected, even though the union had complete charge of processing
the dispute.
CONCLUSION
Two considerations should impel the federal government toward choice of
an expanded doctrine of fair representation rather than legislation of union
democracy. First, considerations of the distribution of power in our federal
system suggest that the regulation of union admission, discipline and election
be left to the states. And second, federal legislation in these areas would fall
170. See text at notes 67, 151 supra.
171. See Kahn, supra note 164, at 371-78; ef. Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation,
2 VUiL. L. Rnv. 151, 163 (1957).
172. Compare Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARv. L. REV. 601 (1956),
with Report of Committee on Improvement of Administration of Union-Employer Con-
tracts, 1954, Individual Grievances, 50 Nw. U.L. REv. 143 (1955).
173. See Cox, Rights Under a Labor Argeement, 69 HARv. L. Rv. 601 (1956).
174. See text at notes 50-58 supra.
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short of the mark. Discharge of the duty to the individual may better be ac-
complished by reviewing union action than by attempting to influence its
action through protection of the member's participation within the union. The
unfortunate truth is not only that members do not always participate in their
union, but that fully protected participation does not always safeguard the
minority from majority abuse.
These two conclusions, however, cannot obscure the fact that an expanded
doctrine of fair representation must be accompanied by a regrettable increase in
government control of collective bargaining. The alternative is to ignore indi-
vidual rights; and this is no real alternative at all.
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